The Himalaya Clause, “stipulation pour autrui”. Non-Responsibility Clauses and Gross Negligence under the Civil Code by Tetley, William
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"The Himalaya Clause, “stipulation pour autrui”. Non-Responsibility Clauses and Gross
Negligence under the Civil Code"
 
William Tetley
Les Cahiers de droit, vol. 20, n° 3, 1979, p. 449-483.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/042325ar
DOI: 10.7202/042325ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 13 février 2017 09:40
The Himalaya Clause, 
"stipulation pour autrui" 
Non-Responsibility Clauses and 
Gross Negligence under the Civil Code 
William TETLEY* 
L'imputation de la responsabilité des pertes et dommages subis par la 
cargaison des navires dans les ports québécois est une question non encore 
tranchée. Le problème se complique du fait de l'introduction, dans la plupart 
des contrats de transport maritime international par connaissement, de la 
clause dite «Himalaya». Cette clause représente à peu près en common law 
l'équivalent de la stipulation pour autrui. La validité de ces clauses a souvent 
été contestée avec succès devant les tribunaux de plusieurs pays, notamment 
de Grande-Bretagne, des États-Unis et du Canada. Par ailleurs, en droit civil, 
si la stipulation pour autrui est admise, ce n'est qu'à titre d'exception et sous 
des conditions très précises. 
L'auteur recense la jurisprudence des pays de common law relativement 
à la clause Himalaya, et examine ensuite la validité de cette clause en droit 
civil à titre de stipulation pour autrui. 
Il traite également du contrat de porte fort, et de la validité des clauses 
de non-responsabilité en cas de faute lourde. 
Enfin, il analyse cinq décisions québécoises récentes, ainsi qu'une impor-
tante décision de la High Court australienne. 
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Introduction 
A number of legal questions of great practical importance are troubling 
to lawyers and to persons who gain their livelihood in the ports of Quebec. 
Who is responsible for goods before loading on board ship or after dis-
charge under the Civil Code of Quebec ? May a stevedore benefit by virtue 
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of a Himalaya clause in a bill of lading — a clause used in common law 
jurisdictions and likened recently to the civil law principle of stipulation 
pour autrui"! Against whom may non-responsibility clauses in bills of lading 
be invoked? When are such clauses ineffective because of gross negligence? ' 
It is intended in this paper to briefly review the common law juris-
prudence relating to the Himalaya clause, to then see if such a clause is 
valid under the Quebec Civil Code principle of stipulation pour autrui, to 
study the non-responsibility clause as a necessary adjunct to the Himalaya 
clause under the Civil Code, and to study gross negligence (faute lourde) in 
respect of operations in the port of Montreal. This will be followed by a 
detailed study of five pertinent Quebec judgments on the question, namely : 
The Prins Willem III (Robert Simpson Montreal Ltd. v. Canadian Overseas 
Shipping and Brown & Ryan et al.)2 ; The Cleveland (Eisen und Metall A. G. v. 
Ceres Stevedoring Co. Ltd. and Canadian Overseas Shipping Ltd.)3; The 
Federal Scheide (Miles International Corporation v. Federal Commerce & 
Navigation ; Federal Stevedoring Ltd. and Belcan N. V.)4 ; The Tarantel 
(Circle Sales & Import v. The Tarantel et al.)5 ; Marubeni America Corp. v. 
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. and I.TO.6. Finally, we shall study the recent New 
York Star1 decision and attempt to draw the appropriate conclusions. 
1. The Himalaya clause and the common law 
1.1. Definitions 
The following is an example of a modern Himalaya clause. This clause 
was used in the Federal Scheide* and is almost identical to the one used in 
the Cleveland9, two of the most recent Quebec Himalaya clause cases. 
1. A detailed study of the Himalaya clause in respect of the common law is to be found in 
W. TETLEY, Marine Cargo Claims, 2na Edition, Toronto and London, Butterworths, 
1978, pp. 373 to 387. Interesting articles on the same subject are : J. PINEAU, "Chronique 
de jurisprudence", (1978) 38 R. du B. 85; M. TANCELIN, "Commentaires", (1977) 55 
Can. Bar Rev. 743; J. BEATSON, "Commentaires", 55 Can. Bar Rev. 746; J. PINEAU, 
"La clause 'Himalaya': la difficile conquête des stevedores", (1979) 39 R. du B. 113. 
2. In first instance: [1968] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 192; [1968] E.T.L. 1163; [1969] A.M.C. 619; 
reversed in appeal: [1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 124. 
3. In first instance: [1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 420; upheld in appeal: [1977] C.A. 56; [1977] 
1 Lloyd's Rep. 665; (1977) 72 D.L.R. (3d) 660. 
4. [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 285. 
5. [1978] 1 F.C. 269. 
6. Unreported Judgment dated Jan. 5, 1979 of the Federal Court of Canada, Mr. Justice 
Marceau, No. T-3177-74. 
7. The New York Star (Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd. v. Salmond and Spraggon (Aus-
tralia) Pty Ltd.), (1978) 18 A.L.R. 333. 
8. Supra, fn. 4. 
9. Supra, fn. 3. 
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18. Exemptions and immunities of all servants and agents of the carrier 
It is hereby agreed that no servant or agent of the Carrier (including every 
independent contractor from time to time employed by the Carrier) shall in 
any circumstances whatsoever be under any liability whatsoever to the Mer-
chant for any loss, damage or delay of whatsoever kind arising or resulting 
directly from any act, neglect or default on his part while acting in the 
course of or in connection with his employment, and, but without prejudice 
to the generality of the foregoing provisions in this Clause, every exemption, 
limitation, condition and liability herein contained and every right, exemp-
tion from liability, defence and immunity of whatsoever nature applicable 
to the Carrier or to which the Carrier is entitled hereunder shall also be 
available and shall extend to protect every such servant or agent of the 
Carrier acting as aforesaid and for the purpose of all the foregoing provi-
sions of this Clause the Carrier is or shall be deemed to be acting as agent 
or trustee on behalf of and for the benefit of all persons who are or might be 
his servants or agents from time to time (including independent contractors 
as aforesaid) and all such persons shall to this extent be or be deemed to be 
parties to this contract in or evidenced by this Bill of Lading. 
1.2. The origin of the Himalaya clause 
The Himalaya clause arose as the result of a decision of the English 
Court of Appeal in the case of Adler v. Dickson (The Himalaya)10 where a 
Mrs. Adler took suit against Captain Dickson, the master of the P. & O. 
passenger ship, the Himalaya. Mrs. Adler had been injured when a gang-
way fell, throwing her 16 feet to the quay below. Her first class passenger 
ticket contained a non-responsibility clause benefiting the carrier and so 
she took suit in tort against Captain Dickson, the master of the Himalaya. 
The Court held that in the carriage of passengers as well as in the 
carriage of goods, the law permitted a carrier to stipulate not only for 
himself, but for those whom he engaged to carry out the contract. It was 
also held that the stipulation might be express or implied. In the case of 
Captain Dickson, however, the Court held that the passenger ticket did not 
expressly or by implication benefit servants or agents and thus Dickson was 
held liable in tort. 
1.3. A summary of the common law judgments 
In Pater son, Zochonis & Co. v. Elder, Dempster & Co. ' ' the House of 
Lords permitted a shipowner to benefit by the terms of a bill of lading 
signed by the charterers. It is noteworthy that this was a pre-Hague Rules 
10. [1955] 1 Q.B. 158; [1954] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 267. 
11. [1924] A.C. 522; 18 LI. L. Rep. 319. 
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case and also that the faulty act in question took place during the contract 
of carriage. 
Although the House of Lords held that the Himalaya clause was 
invalid in Midland Silicones v. Scruttonsn in respect of stevedores for 
damage after discharge, Lord Reid left the door open by setting out four 
now famous conditions whereby the clause possibly could be valid under 
the principle of agency. 
I can see a possibility of success of the agency argument if (first) the bill of lading 
makes it clear that the stevedore is intended to be protected by the provisions in it 
which limit liability, (secondly) the bill of lading makes it clear that the carrier, in 
addition to contracting for these provisions on his own behalf, is also contracting 
as agent for the stevedore that these provisions should apply to the stevedore, 
(thirdly) the carrier has authority from the stevedore to do that, or perhaps later 
ratification by the stevedore would suffice, and (fourthly) that any difficulties 
about consideration moving from the stevedore were overcome. And then to affect 
the consignee it would be necessary to show that the provisions of the Bills of 
Lading Act, 1855, apply13. 
Since the above decision, the Himalaya clause has been altered to 
comply with the first two dicta of Lord Reid while subsequent stevedore/ 
carrier contracts also have acknowledged the carrier's obligation and right 
to contract for the stevedore in compliance with Lord Reid's third dictum u . 
The most difficult problem was with the fourth dictum — the conside-
ration. The Privy Council in The Eurymedon (New Zealand Shipping Co. 
Ltd. v. A.M. Satherwaite & Co. Ltd.)15 supplied the answer when it held (3 
judges to 2) that the consideration for the contract between shipper and 
stevedore was the actual work of the stevedores 16. It is noteworthy that the 
damage took place during discharge when the contract of carriage still 
applied and the carrier was still responsible. 
12. [1962] A.C. 446; [1961] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 365. 
13. [1962] A.C. 446, at p. 474; [1961] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 365, at p. 374. 
14. It is questionable whether the third dictum is really complied with in respect of stevedores 
who usually contract with the terminal agent who in turn contracts with "the carrier". 
In fact even the terminal operator/shipper relationship is in doubt because "the carrier" 
is very likely to be some party such as a shipping line or a charterer who has not issued 
the bill of lading and the real carrier is really the shipowner or owner of the ship or even 
of a substituted ship. (See infra, 7.7.) 
15. [1974] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 534. To me the Eurymedon decision is weak, especially the oft-cited 
arguments of Lord Wilberforce. See TETLEY, supra, fn. 1, p. 382. 
16. Id., at p. 539. Lord Wilberforce: "The performance of these services for the benefit of 
the shipper was the consideration for the agreement by the shipper that the appellant 
should have the benefit of the exemptions and limitations contained in the bill of 
lading." 
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At almost the same time as Midland Silicones the United States 
Supreme Court in Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp}1 denied the 
benefit of the $500 per package limitation to stevedores on the grounds that 
the Himalaya clause was ineffective. In its penultimate sentence, however, 
the court noted that the stevedore in the case in hand was not "a benefi-
ciary o f the contract. This left the door slightly ajar in much the same 
manner as Lord Reid had left it in Midland Silicones. 
Thereafter clauses benefiting stevedores, terminal agents and even 
others were found to be valid in the United States and in the United 
Kingdom l8. In Australia the High Court which originally ruled against the 
Himalaya clause has now declared (3-2) that a Himalaya clause may on 
occasion be valid ". The Court relied on the Eurymedon decision. In this 
particular case, however, a majority of the High Court held that because 
the carrier did not undertake in the bill of lading to care for the goods after 
discharge, the Himalaya clause and the one year suit clause did not apply 
to the stevedore who acted as a bailee after discharge. The stevedore was 
not acting as an agent of the carrier because carrier did not itself undertake 
to care for the goods after discharge. This is similar to the Civil Code 
principle of porte-fort found in art. 1028 C.C. 
In Canada, the Supreme Court in the The Lake Bosomtwe No. 1 
(Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd. v. Pickford & Black)20 ruled in a pre-
Eurymedon decision that the Himalaya clause could not benefit the steve-
dore. Later a Canadian court of first instance in the The Suleyman Staliskiy 
(Calkins & Burke Ltd. v. Far Eastern Steamship Co.)21 considered the 
Eurymedon decision but found that the carrier had no authority to contract 
on behalf of the stevedore and added that it was bound in any event by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in The Lake Bosomtwe No. 1 rather than the 
Privy Council in The Eurymedon. 
1.4. Submission 
It is respectfully submitted that the Himalaya clause which attempts to 
benefit a third party, not a party to a contract and who acts outside the 
17. [1959] A.M.C. 879; 359 U.S. 297, 3 U.S.L. Ed. (2nd) 820; 79 S.Ct. 766; [1959] 
1 Lloyd's Rep. 305. 
18. See W. TETLEY, supra, fn. 1, pp. 377-383. 
19. The New York Star (Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty. Ltd. v. Salmond and Spraggon (Aus-
tralia) Pty. Ltd.), supra, fn. 7; in the Court of Appeal: [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 445. 
20. [1971] S.C.R. 41; [1971] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 343; (1971) 14 D.L.R. (3d) 372; 2 N.S.R. 
(2d) 497. 
21. Supreme Ct. of British Columbia, [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 609 at p. 617; [1977] E.T.L. 
491; (1977) 72 D.L.R. (3d) 625; [1976] 4 W.W.R. 337. 
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terms of the contract (i.e. after discharge or before loading) is a violation of 
one of the basic principles of the law of contract whether of the common 
law or the civil law. The finding of a special contract between the stevedore 
and the shipper for the period after discharge or before loading extends the 
facts and the law beyond their natural meaning. This is especially so 
because the contract of carriage has terminated or is not in effect and the 
carrier who entered into the contract with the shipper is no longer respon-
sible either for the cargo or the acts of the stevedore. 
1.5. Solutions 
There are two solutions to the problem : change the law or rewrite the 
contract. 
1.5.1. Change the law 
It is not the function of the Courts to rewrite the law; rather the 
question should be settled by legislation. Unfortunately, the new inter-
national legislation — the Visby Rules22 of 1968 and the Hamburg Rules23 
of March 31, 1978 do not really regulate the problem. Although the Visby 
Rules make it clear that the stevedore and terminal agent are protected 
from tackle to tackle if acknowledged as préposés of the carrier (i.e. if not 
independent contractors), the grey area before loading and after discharge 
is not legislated upon, because this is the period when the carrier refuses to 
acknowledge that the stevedore is its préposé. The Hamburg Rules intended 
to cover responsibility before loading and after discharge (port to port) but 
the obvious loopholes in art. 4 leave open the issue of responsibility ashore. 
1.5.2. Rewrite the contract 
Another solution is for the carrier in the bill of lading contract to 
undertake to care for cargo before loading and after discharge and then to 
provide in the contract that its agents and préposés (the stevedores) may 
benefit by the terms of the contract. Of course, the carrier does not want 
this responsibility, although the responsibility is really the carrier's under 
22. The Brussels Protocol of February 23, 1968, which amended the Hague Rules of 1924. 
The Visby Rules came into force June 23, 1977 and are now the law of fifteen nations 
including Great Britain, France, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden. See W. TETLEY, 
supra, fn. 1, p. 387. 
23. United Nations Conference on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Hamburg, March 31, 1978. 
The Hamburg Rules are not yet in force as the requisite number of countries have not 
ratified, accepted, approved or acceded. 
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the contract of carriage. It should be noted nevertheless that most modern 
through bills of lading accept responsibility throughout the various steps of 
the carriage, and the question of responsibility of the different carriers is 
settled amongst themselves once the cargo owner has been recompensed for 
its loss. 
1.5.3. France 
France has regulated the Himalaya clause with Gallic precision and 
logic under the internal law of carriage by water of June 18, 1966. The law 
applies before loading and after discharge to carriers, stevedores and termi-
nal agents, but the latter two may enjoy the limitations of liability of the 
carrier under the law. Suit may not be taken directly against the stevedore 
or terminal agent; a single suit must be taken against the carrier who is 
responsible for the fault of the stevedore and terminal agent. Thus court 
proceedings are reduced to a minimum while responsibility is clearly 
defined24. The French internal law has in effect done what the Hague 
Rules, the Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules have failed to do. 
1.5.4. Quebec 
As opposed to France, responsibility of the carrier, the stevedore and 
terminal agent after discharge is far from clear. The result of the lack of 
clarity is that suit is habitually taken against all parties in the hope that one 
may be held responsible. 
Because the law is vague and because stevedores, terminal agents and 
carriers have usually not been held responsible for loss and damage before 
loading and after discharge the port of Montreal is notorious for theft and 
pilferage. This notoriety has directly affected the reputation and efficiency 
of the port25. 
2. Stipulation pour autrui 
2.1. Civil law of contract in Quebec — The basic rule 
Under the civil law as under the common law, it is a basic rule of 
contract that only parties to a contract are bound by the contract. Art. 
24. W. TETLEY, supra, fn. 1, pp. 386-387. See the text of the law at pp. 607-616. 
25. See numerous references to the port of Montreal's reputation in the case cited infra, fn. 
85 to 88. 
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1023 C.C. which is drawn from art. 1165 of the Napoleonic Code reads are 
follows : 
Contracts have effect only between the contracting parties: they cannot affect 
third persons, except in the cases provided in the article of the fifth section of this 
chapter. 
The exceptions are set out in art. 1028 to 1031 C.C. Art. 1028 C.C. 
repeats the general rule: 
A person cannot, by a contract in his own name, bind any one but himself and his 
heirs and legal representatives; 
Then it adds : 
but he may contract in his own name that another shall perform an obligation, 
and in this case he is liable in damages if such obligation be not performed by the 
person indicated. 
This latter is the contract of porte-fort. Here the stipulator is respon-
sible in damages if the third party does not fulfill the contract26. Most, if 
not all, carriers do not want to be held to such a legal relationship with 
stevedores, because they do not want to be responsible for the fault of the 
stevedore. Therefore, carriers rely not on the exception of porte-fort but on 
stipulation pour autrui. 
2.2. Stipulation pour autrui 
Stipulation for another is set out in art. 1029 C.C. : 
A party in like manner may stipulate for the benefit of a third person, when such 
is the condition of a contract which he makes for himself, or of a gift which he 
makes to another ; and he who makes the stipulation cannot revoke it, if the third 
person have signified his assent to it. 
26. Certain authors (J.L. BAUDOUIN, Les obligations, Montréal, P.U.M., 1970, no. 322, 
p. 173; M. TANCELIN, Théorie du droit des obligations, Québec, P.U.L., 1975, no. 210, 
p. 142) have concluded, it is submitted improperly, that by art. 1028 the stipulator has 
no further responsibility once the third party accepts. This is based on the reference 
amongst others in the Codifiers' Report to art. 1141 of the Code Napoléon, but the text 
of art. 1028 C.C. reads otherwise. As pointed out by P.B. MIGNAULT, "Le Code civil 
de la province de Québec et son interprétation", (1935-36) 1 Univ. Tor. L.J. 104, at 
p. 124, the first source of interpretation of the Civil Code is the actual text of the Code 
and only in case of ambiguity may one turn to the Codifiers' Report. There is no 
ambiguity, however, in art. 1028 C.C, while the Codifiers' Report is only a reference. 
P.B. MIGNAULT, Le Droit civil canadien, Montréal, C. Théorêt, 1901, 5* tome, p. 274, 
appears to support the view that the stipulator continues to have responsibility even after 
the third party accepts. 
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Is the Himalaya clause valid in virtue of art. 1029 C.C. ? It is submitted 
that the Himalaya clause does not fall within the terms of art. 1029 C.C. 
for three main reasons : 
First, a Himalaya clause does not confer a benefit, but rather, a 
negative right — the right not to be responsible, the right not to be sued 
delictually. It is one party stipulating that a third party shall not be sued in 
delict (or tort under the common law). To be specific: 
a) a Himalaya clause does not confer a positive right; 
b) art. 1029 C.C. creates rights, it does not destroy them; 
c) a stipulation pour autrui operates as a sword. 
Second, at least two of the terms of stipulation pour autrui are not 
normally fulfilled under the Himalaya clause : 
a) the third party must be determined or determinable ; 
b) the third party must signify his consent. 
Finally, a stipulation for another is an exception and must be inter-
preted restrictively. 
Let us examine each of these arguments in turn. 
2.2.1. May a stipulation pour autrui confer a 
negative benefit? 
2.2.1.1. A Himalaya clause does not confer a positive right 
Art. 1029 and art. 1121 of the French Civil code allow a contracting 
party to stipulate for the benefit of a third party if such stipulation is the 
condition of a contract which he makes for himself or of a gift to another. 
Upon its acceptance by the beneficiary, the stipulation becomes irrevocable. 
Various writers have discussed the Quebec text and its almost identical 
French counterpart, some justifying the stipulation pour autrui as a gestion 
d'affaires21, others seeing it as flowing from the theory of offer and accep-
tance28, and still others calling it an exception to the rule of privity of 
27. M. PLANIOL, Traité élémentaire de droit civil, 10th ed., Paris, L.G.D.J., 1926, vol. 2, 
p. 434 : "Théorie de la gestion d'affaires. [...] Celui qui stipule en faveur d'autrui, sans en 
avoir reçu le mandat, est un gérant d'affaires car il fait pour le compte du tiers une 
opération qu'il aurait pu faire en qualité de mandataire, s'il en avait eu préalablement 
le pouvoir." 
28. M. PLANIOL, id, p. 433: "Théorie de l'offre. [...] D'après cette théorie, le stipulant 
offre au tiers la stipulation qu'il a faite en sa faveur. Cette offre a besoin d'être acceptée 
pour que l'engagement du promettant devienne ferme. L'acceptation une fois faite 
rétroagit au jour du contrat, et le tiers devient alors le créancier personnel du promettant." 
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contracts (relativity in civil law terms) in that it confers a contractual direct 
right on a party exterior to a contract29. 
The "direct right" theory appears to be the most accepted in present-
day Quebec civil law, as supported by Baudouin30, Tancelin31, and Irving32. 
The emphasis, when referring to the term, is generally placed on direct but 
stress must also be placed on right. 
The term "right" and all the elements which flow from it, come up 
again and again in any discussion of the stipulation pour autrui. We know 
that the beneficiary himself has a right in the benefit of the contract, that 
he becomes a creditor of an obligation owed by the promissor, and as such, 
can enforce the execution of that obligation by a direct action33. It is of 
interest to note that all these terms, and the concepts they represent (right, 
obligation, creditor) are foreign to the mechanism of exemption clauses. If 
the very terminology employed to define a stipulation is wholly inappro-
priate when speaking of an exemption clause, how can the former embrace 
the latter ? Laurent goes even as far as to say that a stipulation without an 
action is not obligatory, and is therefore, null34. It is common knowledge 
that an exemption clause cannot be "enforced" — it operates to prevent the 
enforcement of obligations, and if anything, alleviates the burden of paying 
damages upon a finding of fault. Thus, from the outset, the Himalaya 
clause and art. 1029 would seem to be incompatible conceptually and on 
the level of terminology. 
29. M. PLANIOL, id, p. 435: "Théorie de la création directe de l'action. [...] si on admet 
l'existence immédiate du droit des tiers, avant que ce futur créancier ait manifesté sa 
volonté, il y a bel et bien entre lui et son débiteur engagement par volonté unilatérale." 
30. J.L. BAUDOUIN, supra, fn. 26, no. 326, pp. 174-175: "[...] l'autonomie de la stipulation 
pour autrui." 
31. M. TANCELIN, supra, fn. 26, no. 215, p. 145: "La stipulation pour autrui est une 
institution autonome [...]." 
32. CK. IRVING, "Article 1029 C.C. : Stipulation for a Third Party — Notes on the 
Jurisprudence of Quebec", (1963) 9 McGill L.J. 337, at p. 344: "In summary, then, the 
authorities appear to establish : a) that the right conferred on the beneficiary is created 
by the contract itself, is retroactive upon acceptance to the date of the contract, and 
never formed part of the patrimony of either stipulator or promisor; b) that the 
beneficiary's right is exclusive to him." 
33. Id., p. 343. See also H., L. and J. MAZEAUD, Leçons de Droit civil, 4 lh ed., Paris, 
Montchrestien, 1973, t. 2, vol. 1, p. 804: "[...] confère un droit direct au tiers bénéficiaire 
contre le promettant." 
34. F. LAURENT, Droit civil français, 5th ed., Paris, Librairie A. Marescq, 1878, vol. 15, 
p. 628 : "[...] une stipulation dépourvue d'action n'est pas obligatoire, elle est nulle." 
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2.2.1.2. Art. 1029 creates rights — it does not destroy them 
It is acknowledged that art. 1029 has been utilized to serve purposes 
other than those which were probably within the contemplation of the 
codifiers at the time of its inception. Nonetheless, any new uses attributed 
to the provision have always followed the path of creating a direct right of 
action for the benefit of third party exterior to the contract. 
Art. 1029 has come to be used quite extensively in the realm of 
insurance law, both in automobile and life insurance, to support a contrac-
tual claim by a party who is not privy to the contractual agreement. This 
explains the upholding of an omnibus clause in the cases of: Canadian 
Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Wawanesa Mutual35 and Halle v. Canadian Indemnity 
Co.36 
The mechanism of stipulation pour autrui has also been employed to 
explain the procedure of nominating a beneficiary in a life policy as seen in 
Venner v. Sun Life31 and many other judgments38. 
It should be noted that in all the above cases, and in all others in 
which reliance has been on art. 1029 the situation to which the provision 
was applicable, though diverse in detail, was always of the same nature. All 
were cases where rights were created to benefit a third party rather than 
being destructive of rights to give a third party an advantage, as in a 
Himalaya clause. 
This significant distinction takes on even more prominence in the 
Draft Civil Code. Here, art. 8639, the equivalent of our present art. 1029 
C.C. specifically states that the stipulation gives rise to a direct right by the 
beneficiary against the promissor. Without this right, it seems difficult to 
imagine the existence of an art. 86 stipulation pour autrui at all. Since no 
such right emanates from a Himalaya clause, it does not seem possible to 
characterize this phenomenon as a stipulation pour autrui. 
A negative stipulation for another was attempted at one time by 
automobile manufacturers but soon dropped. A normal automobile gua-
35. [1973]"C.A. 196 at p. 200. 
36. [1937] S.C.R. 368 at p. 376. 
37. (1889) 17 S.C.R. 394. 
38. Robitaille v. Assurance-Vie Desjardins, [1976] C A . 617; 
Laroche v. Great West Life Assurance Co., [1975] C S . 4; 
Canada Life Assurance Co.. v. Giroux, [1973] C S . 897; 
Pelletier v. Société des Artisans, [1971] C S . 7; 
Morrissette v. Pinard & Metropolitan Life, [1971] C S . 200; 
Marchand v. Mutual Life, [1968] C S . 215. 
39. CIVIL CODE REVISION OFFICE, Report on the Québec Civil Code, Québec, Éditeur officiel 
du Québec, 1978, vol. I, Book V, art. 86, at p. 344. 
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rantee is in the name of the manufacturer and is a certificate delivered to 
the purchaser by the vendor with the sales contract. The vendor in the sales 
contract is able to exclude its own legal warranty in virtue of art. 1507 C.C. 
but has been held responsible if the manufacturer does not fulfill the 
conventional warranty40. For a brief period of time it was the vendor who 
provided the conventional warranty in the contract of sale and added that 
suit could not be taken against the manufacturers in delict or tort. This 
latter exclusion was never upheld by the courts, to my knowledge, and the 
automobile manufacturers and dealers soon returned to the normal system 
of warranty by the manufacturer. In other words, if automobile manufac-
turers wish to exclude delictual responsibility they must be part of the 
contract and must accept responsibilities under that contract41. 
In the same way the negative stipulation under art. 1029 C.C. in 
favour of stevedores is invalid, as it would allow stevedores to avoid suit in 
delict without being responsible contractually. If permitted, incidentally, it 
would circumvent the whole meaning and economy of art. 1028 C.C.42 
In summary, it may be said that art. 1029 C.C. has always operated to 
create a right where none would have otherwise existed ; a Himalaya clause, 
on the other hand, has for its purpose the destruction of a claim which 
otherwise would have been available. The right created by art. 1029 C.C. is 
of a contractual nature, whereas the one excluded by a Himalaya clause 
finds its basis in the law of delict. Though both the creation of a contrac-
tual right for a third party and the destruction of a right in delict against a 
third party operate to the advantage of that third party, the two concepts 
are far from being on an equal footing. A stipulation pour autrui has always 
been limited to the former case, and there appears to be no sound reason to 
extend its application to the latter. 
2.2.1.3. Stipulation pour autrui operates as a "sword" 
As has been noted earlier, a stipulation pour autrui operates so as to 
give a third party exterior to a contract a direct and contractual right of 
action against the promissor. Thus, the benefit arising from a stipulation 
pour autrui is directly enforceable by the third party. This is not the case 
with respect to a Himalaya clause. In a case of stipulation pour autrui, 
control rests with the beneficiary ; it is he who may opt to assert his right to 
the benefit stipulated in his favour by commencing suit. In a Himalaya 
clause, however, the matter is entirely out of the beneficiary's hands — he 
40. Touchette v. Pizzagalli, [1938] S.C.R. 433. 
41. This principle is an essential element of General Motors v. Kravitz, (1979) 25 N.R. 271. 
42. See fn. 26. 
462 Les Cahiers de Droit (1979) 20 c. de D. 449 
can only assert his entitlement to the benefit stipulated on his behalf by 
answering any action brought against him with the clause. 
In effect, a stipulation pour autrui must always be capable of being used 
as a sword — as a basis upon which to commence suit. A Himalaya clause 
on the other hand serves merely as a shield — a defence mechanism. 
2.2.2. Conditions of a stipulation pour autrui 
It is a condition of a stipulation for another that the third party should 
be determined at the time of the stipulation. This is because a stipulation 
for another is an exception to the general rule of contract as found in 1023 
C.C. Nevertheless the jurisprudence has allowed the third party to be 
"determinable" 4 \ This is normal in the case of insurance which is rein-
forced by art. 1030, where it is stated that one is deemed to have stipulated 
for his heirs and assigns. 
Assuming that the third party need only be determinable, does the 
Himalaya clause adequately define the third party beneficiary? For 
example, the terminology in the Himalaya clause in The Federal Scheide** 
was extremely vague. The generic words "stevedore" or "terminal agent" 
were not used, let alone the exact corporate names. Are the words "servant 
or agent of the Carrier (including every independent contractor from time 
to time employed by the Carrier)" sufficient to allow the consignee or 
shipper to determine in whose favour it has waived its rights in delict ? Is 
this sufficient notice? Is it notice at all? 
It is also a condition of art. 1029 C.C. that the third party must "have 
signified his assent"45. Is this done under a Himalaya clause? Was it really 
done in the Federal Scheide case ? The undertaking in the contract of the 
terminal agent with the carrier is presumably the act necessary to fulfill 
Lord Reid's third requirement but is this sufficient in civil law? Is signifi-
cation possible before the stipulation ? The carrier and terminal agent make 
a contract at the beginning of the year and various bills of lading are issued 
thereafter benefitting the terminal agent. The agent does not signify agree-
ment to each bill of a multitude of different bills of ladings, which are no 
doubt with various carriers depending on the owners and charterers of the 
vessels involved. Is there signification at all? 
43. J.L. BAUDOUIN, supra, fn. 26, no. 329, p. 176; M. TANCELIN, supra, fn. 26, no. 217, 
p. 147. 
44. Supra, fn. 8. 
45. J.L. BAUDOUIN, supra, fn. 26, no. 330, p. 176. 
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2.2.3. Restrictive approach 
It should be noted that art. 1029 C.C. is an exception to a basic 
principle of the law of contract (art. 1023 C.C), in that it allows a third 
party to benefit by an agreement to which he is not privy. 
As an exceptional provision therefore, art. 1029 C.C. must be given a 
restrictive interpretation and should not be stretched to encompass new 
situations which alter its purpose. A restrictive approach would prevent the 
inclusion of the negative benefit of a Himalaya clause in art. 1029 C.C. 
3. The non-responsibility clause 
Assuming that the stevedore may enjoy a negative benefit in virtue of 
the principles of stipulation pour autrui or of porte-fort as set out in the 
Himalaya clause, is the non-responsibility clause also to be found in the bill 
of lading, applicable against a third party? 
A valid non-responsibility clause is subject to strict qualifications46: 
a) The party subject to the non-responsibility clause must have received 
notice of the clause or must at least be aware of the clause. 
b) A non-responsibility clause must be interpreted restrictively and there-
fore should be specific47. 
c) The clause must be consented to or at least be acquiesced in by the 
party subject to the clause48. 
d) The clause has no effect in cases of gross negligence49. 
3.1. Notice of the non-responsibility clause 
If the non-responsibility clause is not set out clearly in the contract 
then it cannot apply against a consignee or shipper. The jurisprudence is 
replete with cases of the party affected by a non-responsibility clause not 
being given adequate notice either on the back of a passenger ticket or on a 
parking lot wall, etc.50 
46. Id., no. 587, p. 309: "Après quelques hésitations, la jurisprudence a admis le principe 
général de la validité de ces clauses mais a du même coup imposé des limites très 
strictes à leur utilisation." See also L. SARNA, Traité de la clause de non-responsabilité, 
Toronto, Richard de Boo Ltd., 1976, pp. 56 ff. 
47. J.L. BAUÖOUIN, supra, fn. 26, no. 592, p. 312; M. TANCELIN, supra, fn. 26, no. 598, 
p. 400; Glengoil S.S. Co. v. Pitkington, (1897) 28 S.C.R. 146, at p. 159. 
48. J.L. BAUDOUIN, supra, fn. 26, no. 591, p. 311. 
49. Id., no. 590, p. 310; M. TANCELIN, supra, fn. 26, no. 598, p. 399. 
50. Girard v. National Parking, [1971] C.A. 328; P. AZARD, "Le contrat d'adhésion", 
(1960) 20 R. du B. 337; J.L. BAUDOUIN, supra, fn. 26, p. 311, fn. 299; Orner Barré 
Verdun Liée v. Wawanesa, [1968] B.R. 726, p. 728. 
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In The Clevelandil the dock receipt referred to a short form bill of 
lading, which referred to a long form bill of lading, (never issued) which 
contained a Himalaya clause which referred to "servants and agents" 
which in turn referred to an after discharge and before loading clause 
(No. 18) which only mentioned "servants or agents". Was this sufficient 
notice to the consignee or shipper that a certain stevedoring firm or a 
certain terminal agency would not be responsible for its fault in the care of 
the cargo in the port of Montreal ? Is this specific and clear enough if a 
non-responsibility clause must be interpreted restrictively ? 
3.2. Restrictive interpretation 
A non-responsibility clause being an exception must be specific and is 
interpreted restrictively. It should clearly set out who benefits and for what 
acts or actions. For example is the wording of the dock receipt explicit ? Is 
the wording of the short form bill of lading, of the Himalaya clause, of the 
non-responsibility clause and of the long form bill of lading sufficiently 
explicit ? Do the engagement note, the dock receipt, the bills of lading, the 
Himalaya clause and the non-responsibility clause provide a clear and 
unbroken chain of contract and notice ? Is there notice when the stevedore 
and terminal agent are not named even generically, let alone by their actual 
corporate names in these clauses but only as "servants and agents". Were 
these questions really asked in The Cleveland*2 and The Federal Scheide", 
etc.? 
3.3. Consent or acquiescence 
When does the shipper consent or acquiesce in the stevedore and 
terminal agent benefiting by the terms of the non-responsibility clause in 
the bill of lading? When do they learn of the existence of the clause, of its 
terms and the parties who are actually benefiting? Do the shipper and 
consignee get valid notice of the clause, of its effects, and of who benefits? 
To acquiesce or consent one must first have read or seen the contract, or 
have been advised of the non-responsibility provision. The jurisprudence is 
replete with examples of nullity of the clause for failure to advise the party 
whose rights are limited by that clause54. 
51. Supra, fn. 3. 
52. Ibid. 
53. Supra, fn. 4. 
54. Dechêne v. Chemin de Fer Canadien du Pacifique, (1915) 47 CS. 431, at p. 437; Orner 
Barré Verdun Liée v. Wawanesa, supra, fn. 50. 
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4. Gross negligence (Faute lourde) 
A non-responsibility clause is ineffective in cases of faute lourde or 
fraud under the civil law. Faute lourde has been defined by Pothier as 
follows : 
dans le fait de ne pas apporter aux affaires d'autrui le soin que les personnes les 
moins soigneuses et les plus stupides ne manquent pas d'apporter à leurs affaires. 
Cette faute est opposée à la bonne foi55. 
But is it not faute lourde if there is continued theft and lack of care in 
the port of Montreal with the result that Montreal's reputation is unen-
viable ? Is it not fraudulent for carriers to intentionally maintain, year after 
year, their admittedly negligent practices in the port of Montreal? 
Does not the same negligence with abandon and intent over a period 
of time become gross negligence? Is there good faith {bonne foi) in accor-
dance with Pothier's definition? Is it not fraudulent for carriers, stevedores 
and terminal agents who are aware of the conditions in the port and their 
own lack of care, not to change their practices? 
5. Recent Quebec judgments 
Let us now look at five Quebec judgments where the Himalaya clause 
and non-responsibility clauses have been in issue. 
5.1. The Prins Willem HI (Robert Simpson Montreal Ltd. v. 
Canadian Overseas Shipping and Brown & Ryan et al.) 56 
In this early case the Himalaya clause was not the issue. The vessel 
arrived in Montreal on October 14, 1963, the advice note was sent October 
15, 1963 and the cargo was picked up on October 17, 1963 at which time 18 
cartons of ski boots were missing. 
Mr. Justice A.I. Smith of the Superior Court held that there was no 
negligence on the part of stevedores and terminal agents, nor was there a 
contract between them and the consignee. On the other hand, the carrier 
could not benefit by the non-responsibility after discharge clause in the bill 
of lading because the carrier had acknowledged that it had certain obli-
gations after discharge, those being checking and watching services. 
55. M. BUGNET (ed.), Œuvres de Pothier, Paris, Pion, 1861, t. 22, p. 497, cited in The King 
v. CSL, [1950] S.C.R. 532, at p. 537 (affd by Privy Council). "Gross negligence", 
although used interchangeably with faute lourde in this article and in The Cleveland, The 
Federal Scheide, and The Tarantel is really a common law term. 
56. In first instance: [1968] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 192. 
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Smith J. considered art. 2430 C.C. which read as follows: 
2430. Whenever any vessel has arrived at its destination in any port in Lower 
Canada and the Master thereof has notified the consignee, either by public 
advertisements or otherwise, that such cargo has reached the place desi-
gnated in the bill of lading, such consignee is bound to receive the same 
within twenty-four hours after notice ; and thereafter such cargo, so soon as 
placed on the wharf, is at the risk and charges of the consignee or owner. 
Smith J. also considered the consequences of the advice note which 
read: 
The above-mentioned goods have arrived and remain at Owner's risk of fire, 
flood, pilferage or damage from any cause whatsoever. If goods are not removed 
within five days from time of loading they may be trucked to store at Owner's risk 
and expense " . 
The Court held that because there was no proof of when discharge 
took place, art. 2430 and the advice note could not have effect. It is well 
known and the court record showed that carriers' records of discharge of 
general cargo in Montreal are extremely meagre, because proper tallies are 
not usually taken as in other ports. Instead a superficial list of shortages is 
usually made up later in the shed. 
Smith J. particularly noted: 
Moreover the reasonableness of said defendant's conduct and the manner in which 
it discharged its duties must be judged with proper regard to the difficulties of the 
situation as it existed at Shed 25 into which all manner of persons were allowed 
free and unchallenged access, and which provided little in the way of protection 
against pilferage58. 
Smith. J. did not note that the disreputable situation in the sheds in 
Montreal exists as the direct choice of the carrier and its agents. It is 
respectfully submitted that as long as courts continue to find carriers and 
their agents not responsible, carriers will not care for goods but will 
continue to be negligent and will allow "all manner of persons... free and 
unchallenged access...", etc. 
The Prins Willem III was reversed in appeal by the Quebec Court of 
Appeal59. Owen J. who rendered the judgment, agreed that while there was 
no contract between the consignee and the stevedore or the terminal agent, 
fault was not proven against them. The Court added in respect of the 
Himalaya clause: 
Having come to the conclusion that no fault was proved against the stevedores 
and the ship's agents I find it unnecessary to consider whether they would be 
57. Id, at p. 193. 
58. Id., at p. 199. 
59. [1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 124. 
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entitled to benefit from exonerating clauses in the bill of lading if they had been 
proved at fault60. 
The Court of Appeal also held that non-responsibility after discharge 
clause in the bill of lading overcame any responsibility of the carrier against 
the consignee under art. 2430 C.C. or the advice note. 
The Court did not believe there was any fault on behalf of stevedores 
or terminal agents although there was considerable evidence in the record 
of confusion in the shed, of elderly underpaid watchmen who testified that 
they only "watched" but did not act if they saw any pilfering because they 
were only paid as "watchmen", etc. The chaos was considered negligence 
but normal all the same.61 
5.2. The Cleveland (Eisen und Metall A.G. v. 
Ceres Stevedoring) " 
The Cleveland concerned the theft before loading of a container 
received in the port of Montreal for carriage by sea on the vessel The 
Cleveland. The heavy container holding valuable copper scrap had been left 
unattended in the open beside a public road next to a 25 ton lifter with the 
key in the ignition and the motor running. Madam Justice Réjane L. Colas 
of the Quebec Superior Court held the Himalaya clause to be invalid, 
relying on Midland Silicones". Colas J. also found that there had been 
gross negligence so that the stevedore and terminal agent were jointly and 
severally liable. The trial judge visited the place of the theft, and her 
observations on the conditions in the port are interesting. 
The undersigned, wishing to visualize the area where about the said container had 
been placed and from which it disappeared, that is between sheds 32 and 33, has 
visited same. The undersigned has noticed that said area has remained substan-
tially the same as that outlined in the plans filed in the record as exhibits P-27 and 
P-33 and had also the opportunity to see a lifter in operation. The Court has come 
to the conclusion that the lifting and loading of a 20-foot container on a truck of 
at least the same length could hardly pass unnoticed from the office situated on 
the west side of shed 33 where certain employees of Ceres were working, the 
60. Id, at p. 126. 
61. The public record of this case is replete with evidence of general negligence in the shed 
affecting all cargo there. The consignee who of course was not present in the shed at the 
time of the theft oould not make specific proof of the negligence with respect to his 
cargo. It should also be said that this was of course an early case of shortage in the 
port of Montreal and a pattern of the conditions there had not been established. 
62. In first instance: [1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 420; in appeal: [1977] C.A. 56; [1977] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 665 (The brief judgment in French of Tremblay C.J. is not to be found in the 
Lloyd's Rep. Only the judgment of Owen J. is reported there.) 
63. Supra, fn. 12. 
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distance between the north-west corner of said office and the north-east corner of 
shed 32 being approximately 80 ft. (exd. P-33). The Court must reach the 
conclusion that the employees of the defendants could not fail to see the 
20-foot container, the lifter and the truck in so small an area, from any one 
of the five (5) windows or door, and on time to interfere with the removal 
of said container. It has been established also that the container was of a 
brown colour and that it was the only container of that colour in said area, 
the others were red. Furthermore, the Court has not been satisfied with the 
explanations whereby the said container had been left unprotected and unattended 
on the Montreal waterfront for six (6) full days, when in fact it could have been 
loaded aboard the ship Cleveland which had arrived at the dock on or about Nov. 
29, 1969. The Court fails to understand why they waited until the day of departure 
to look after said container for loading, and why the employees of Ceres did not 
report the theft immediately after they saw the truck loaded with the brown 
container leaving the premises, but waited until someone called for the container64. 
In appeal Owen J. of the Quebec Court of Appeal held the Himalaya 
clause to be valid and relied solely on the common law and in particular on 
Lord Wilberforce in The Eurymedon65. The Supreme Court decision in The 
Lake Bosomtwe (No. 1)66 was ignored as being overcome by the later Privy 
Council decision in The Eurymedon61. Owen J. also ignored the fact that 
the stevedore did not contract with the carrier but only with the terminal 
agent68. The second of Lord Reid's dicta concerning an agreement between 
the carrier and the stevedore that the stevedore should be benefitted was 
thus not fulfilled. 
Owen J. did agree however that there was gross negligence of the 
stevedores and terminal agents which overcame the non-responsibility 
clause. 
It is noteworthy that the Himalaya clause in The Cleveland was almost 
identical to the Himalaya clause in The Federal Scheide69, while in The 
Cleveland the non-responsibility clause read as follows: 
Clause 5 reading in part as follows: 
5. Period of non-responsibility. 
The carrier shall not be liable for loss of or damage to the goods during the 
period before loading and after discharge from the vessel, howsoever such loss 
or damage arises...™ 
64. [1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 420 at p. 424. In appeal the visiting of the site by the trial 
judge alone and after the trial had been terminated was questioned but it is noteworthy 
that the Court by this method at least discovered the true conditions in the port of 
Montreal and held that there was gross negligence. 
65. Supra, fn. 15. 
66. Supra, fn. 20. 
67. Supra, fn. 15. 
68. See detailed comments in W. TETLEY, supra, note 1, pp. 383 à 384. 
69. See text at fn. 8, supra. 
70. [1977] C.A. 56, at p. 58; [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 665, at p. 667. 
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Tremblay C.J. in a very brief judgment took a completely different 
tack from Owen J. and held that the obligation of the stevedore and the 
terminal agent was contractual and was the result of a deposit receipt (the 
dock receipt)71. This was presumably "deposit" under the Civil Code. 
Tremblay C.J. then held that the dock receipt invoked the non-responsibility 
clause in the bill of lading but could not overcome gross negligence. 
Tremblay C.J. did not elaborate on this contract. Is it deposit when 
simple deposit is gratuitous? If it is not deposit, is it an innominate 
contract? What is the cause or consideration? Has the notice of non-
responsibility been properly given when the dock receipt only referred to a 
yet not issued short form bill of lading which in turn referred to a never 
issued long form bill of lading which contained a Himalaya clause which in 
turn invoked a non-responsibility clause which finally referred only to 
"servants and agents" and not to "stevedores or agents" and not to the 
stevedores or agents by their actual name? Where was the consent or 
acquiescence of the shipper or consignee? 
5.3. The Federal Scheide 
In the case of the Federal Scheide12 scrap metal was received in the 
port of Montreal, weighed and then packed into containers. The containers 
were sealed, held in the port for a period of time by stevedores and 
terminal agents and then loaded on board a ship for Antwerp. Upon arrival 
in Antwerp the seals were found to have been changed (with new seals from 
Montreal) and a substantial loss of scrap was ascertained. The Court found 
that the loss took place in the hands of and due to the fault of the 
stevedores and terminal agents in Montreal. 
The contractual relations were as follows: 
a) An engagement note was issued bearing the following statement: 
Subject to all the terms, conditions, exceptions and liberties expressed in the bill of 
lading in current use by the steamship company at time of shipment in respect of 
each of the shipments that shall be made pursuant thereto". 
b) A dock receipt was then issued which read: 
Non-negotiable Dock Receipt — issued by Federal Stevedoring Limited as agents 
only for and on behalf of Federal Commerce Line. 
71. Id, at p. 65, but the text of the dock receipt was not given in the judgment. 
72. [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 285. 
73. Id, at p. 289. 
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1. This dock receipt... is subject to all the terms and conditions exceptions and 
liberties set out in the Bill of Lading in current use by the above mentioned 
line '". 
c) A short form bill of lading was issued which read: 
All the terms of the Federal Commerce and Navigation Company Limited regular 
form of bill of lading are incorporated herein with like force and effect as if they 
were written at length herein " . 
d) Apparently no long form bill of lading was issued. 
e) The long form bill of lading contained a Himalaya clause76. 
f) The long form bill of lading contained a non-responsibility clause 
which read: 
5. Period of responsibility 
The Carrier or his agent shall not be liable for loss of or damage to the goods 
during the period before loading and after discharge from the vessels " . 
O'Connor J. of the Quebec Superior Court found that the Himalaya 
clause in the long form bill of lading permitted the terminal agent and the 
stevedore to benefit by the non-responsibility clause also in that bill of 
lading. The Court relied on the principle of stipulation pour autrui and art. 
1029 C.C. and relied on two insurance cases : Halle v. The Canadian 
Indemnity Co. n and Venner v. Sun Life79, noting that stipulation for 
another need not merely apply to insurance cases. The Court did not 
consider the question of the validity of stipulating a negative benefit or 
right and did not contrast the Himalaya clause negative benefit with the 
positive benefit in insurance contracts. 
Nor did the Court consider whether the stevedore was determined or 
determinable under the Himalaya clause or whether there had been signi-
fication. 
The Court did hold that there was acquiescence in the stipulation pour 
autrui by the stevedore and terminal agent80. 
In respect to the non-responsibility clause the judgment disregarded 
the tenuous relationship of the shipper/consignee through the dock receipt 
and engagement note to the short form bill of lading to the unissued long 
74. Id., at p. 291. 
75. Id., at p. 289. 
76. See text at fn. 8, supra. 
77. Supra, fn. 72, at p. 285. 
78. [1937] S.C.R. 368. 
79. (1889) 17 S.C.R. 394. 
80. [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 285, at p. 292. 
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form bill of lading to the Himalaya clause and finally to the non-
responsibility clause. The Court did not consider whether this was adequate 
notice to the shipper/consignee or whether the clause was sufficiently 
specific. The clarity of the identification of the parties under the non-
responsibility clause was also not considered. It should be noted that the 
corporate names of the stevedores were not mentioned nor were the words 
"stevedores" or "terminal agent". 
The Court noted The Lake Bosomtwe No. 1, The Eurymedon, The 
Cleveland*1, and Walsh J. in The Tarantel12 but held that Quebec law 
should apply particularly as the contract was made in Quebec for an 
outward shipment. 
In respect to gross negligence the judgment is puzzling. Gross negli-
gence was defined in accordance with Pothier's definition oîfaute lourde in 
The King v. CSL%i. Numerous examples of negligence in the port of 
Montreal were then given as well as the fact that the container had had its 
seal replaced by a new seal provided in Montreal. Yet no gross negligence 
was found. The following are some of the Court's statements as to negli-
gence. 
It is relevant to note that according to the evidence the port of Montreal from the 
point of view of goods disappearing by theft from the waterfront, did not have at 
that time a particularly good reputation". 
Other things being equal, it would appear that the unfenced and poorly guarded 
Montreal waterfront with its unsatisfactory reputation creates a serious probability 
that the theft occurred at this site. In this connection it was noted that at that very 
time at the Montreal waterfront another theft of a full container took place. It was 
the subject of that case which resulted, finally, in the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in Ceres Stevedoring Co. Ltd. v. Eisen und Metall A.G. and Canadian 
Overseas Shipping Ltd., (1977) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 665 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Cleveland decision)85. The evidence made of poorly paid personnel of the guard 
service firm and the unreliability of the then Harbour police force must also be 
considered in arriving at the probable location of this theft (a theft was certainly 
involved although no direct evidence of a theft was made). Witness moreover the 
discovery at Olen that the seals on the four suspect containers were different from 
those with which they were originally sealed as shown by the dock receipts when 
the containers were first stuffed after the coils had been unloaded from the trucks 
at shed 5986. 
Reverting for a moment to the quality of the special guards hired by the private 
security firm retained by defendant Stevedoring. These men appeared to have been 
81. Id., at p. 291. 
82. Id., at p. 292. 
83. Id., at p. 289. 
84. Id, at p. 287. 
85. Id, at p. 288. 
86. Ibid. 
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all of a certain age who normally during the winter months would work as guards 
in institutions in order to avoid outside work during the cold Montreal winters 
months. The guard assigned to the 12 hour watch would certainly have been 
obliged to leave the place under his scrutiny during those 12 hours. If he was 
seated in an automobile, his eyes might have been closed by sleep or he might have 
been threatened or paid to keep them closed87. 
Admittedly, one seems here to be entering the realm of conjecture but when 
reminded that this theft involved the removal of at least five tons of material, the 
probabilities are that some "inside" cooperation must have been achived by the 
thieves to effect the abstraction of such heavy and cumbersome material. And, 
again, such a possibility is consistent with the record of heavy loss of cargo at the 
port of Montreal during that time88. 
5.4. The Tarantel (Circle Sales & Import Ltd. v. 
The Tarantel et al.) 
The claim in The Tarantel89 arose from pilferage of cartons of walkie 
talkies and hairdryers which had been carried in the ship Tarantel from 
Hong Kong and Yokahama to Montreal. 
Walsh J. of the Federal Court of Canada found the stevedores and the 
terminal agents jointly and severally responsible for the shortage and 
relieved the carrier of liability. 
The vessel was discharged on September 26 and 27, 1973 and the cargo 
was stolen in the night of October 2, 3, 1973 from a locked security locker 
in a National Harbours Board shed leased by the terminal agent. The 
question of an advice note or of art. 2430 C.C. was not raised in the 
judgment. 
The Himalaya clause read as follows: 
3. Identity of Carrier and Himalaya Clause. 
All defences under this B/L shall inure also to the benefit of the Carrier's 
agents, servants and employees and of any independent contractor, including 
stevedores, performing any of the Carrier's obligations under the contract of 
carriage or acting as bailee of the goods, whether sued in contract or in tort. 
For the purpose of this clause all such persons, firms or legal entities as alluded 
to above shall be deemed to be parties to the contract evidenced by this B/L 
and the person, firm or legal entity signing this B/L shall be deemed to be 
their agent or trustee'0. 
87. Ibid. 
88. Ibid. 
89. [1978] 1 F.C. 269. 
90. Id., at p. 273. 
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The non-responsibility clause read : 
5. Period of Responsibility. 
If this Bill of Lading is not issued for a shipment to or from U.S. Ports, then 
notwithstanding any other provisions herein, goods in the custody of the 
Carrier or his agents or servants before loading and after discharge, whether 
awaiting shipment or whether being forwarded to or from the vessel, landed, 
stored ashore or afloat, or pending transshipment, at any stage of the whole 
transport, are in such custody at the sole risk of the Merchant and thus the 
carrier has no responsibility whatsoever for the goods prior to the loading on 
and subsequent to the discharge from the Vessel". 
The stevedores hired the terminal agents and also contracted with 
Barber Lines whom the Court held to be the carrier. The terminal agents 
for their part contracted with Pinkerton's of Canada who were to provide 
guard service in the shed area. It should also be understood that the 
National Harbours Board in its lease of the shed to the terminal agents 
called for certain security measures92. 
The watching service and terminal operation actually embraced four 
sheds each 500 to 600 feet in length and the single Pinkerton guard on duty 
after midnight had to walk nearly a half mile in each direction on his 
rounds93. It is thought that the theft occurred from the water side and the 
guard testified he did not circle the sheds, did not examine the water side 
and "that nobody had told him what he was supposed to do"9 4 . Testimony 
was made by a Lieutenant of police of National Harbours Board that one 
watchman was not sufficient95 and Pinkerton's supervisor testified that the 
terminal had refused additional watchmen because of the cost96. 
On the question of negligence Walsh J. ruled : 
Despite the history of breaking and entering and thefts in the Montreal Harbour 
at the time, of which both said defendants were well aware, they chose to save 
money by not providing an extra guard to watch the security locker in shed 39 
during the night. If this had been done the theft could not have taken place and 
the theft was neither unforeseeable nor unpreventable. I therefore find negligence 
on their part. No negligence can be found against Barber Lines for employing 
Wolfe Stevedores (1968) Ltd., a well-known and experienced stevedoring firm to 
look after the discharging of cargo and warehousing of same until delivery nor was 
the loss in any way attributable to any fault of the owners of the ship Tarantel''1. 
91. Id, at p. 274. 
92. Id., at p. 276. 
93. Id., at p. 277. 
94. Id., at p. 279. 
95. Id., at p. 280. 
96. Id, at pp. 282, 283. 
97. Id., at p. 283. 
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The Himalaya clause98, the non-responsibility clause " and the contract 
between the carrier and the stevedores were then noted. The latter read as 
follows : 
It is further expressly understood and agreed that the company will include the 
Contractor as an express beneficiary, to the extent of the services to be performed 
hereunder, of all rights, immunities and limitation of liability provisions of all 
contracts of affreightment, as evidenced by its standard bills of lading and/or 
passenger tickets, issued by the company during the effective period of this 
agreement...100 
Walsh J. then skillfully reviewed the pertinent American jurisprudence 
and held that under American law the Himalaya clause would give pro-
tection to the stevedore, but possibly not to the terminal agent who was 
only an agent of the stevedore but "not of the carrier" '01. British and 
Canadian jurisprudence were then reviewed and it was held that there had 
been compliance with the requirements of that jurisprudence. In particular 
this was a case of a post-Midland Silicones, Himalaya clause102 upheld by 
The Eurymedon103 and therefore the Quebec Court of Appeal in The 
Cleveland applied rather that The Lake Bosomtwe104. 
The Court considered art. 1029 C.C. but did not believe that Quebec 
law applied to inward shipments under bills of lading issued in Hong Kong 
and Tokyo. 
In an interesting obiter in respect to outward shipments Mr. Justice 
Walsh said: 
If we were dealing with outward shipments from Quebec where the bill of lading 
was issued article 1029 might then be invoked although I would in any case 
consider it highly regrettable if principles of Canadian maritime law which should 
be the same throughout the country could be so interpreted as to lead to a 
different result with respect to a bill of lading made in Quebec from that with 
respect to an identical bill of lading made in one of the other provincesl05. 
The Himalaya clause however could have no effect, the Court ruled, 
because the contract between the stevedore and the carrier contained a 
clause relieving the stevedore for responsibility for pilferage and this had 
98. Id, at p. 273. 
99. Id, at p. 274. 
100. Id., at p. 283. 
101. Id., at p. 285. See supra, fn. 68 for a comparison with Owen J. 
102. Id., at p. 286. 
103. Id, at p. 287. 
104. Id, at p. 289. 
105. Id, at p. 293. 
W. TETLEY The Himalaya Clause 475 
been struck out106. Without saying so the court was probably referring to 
Lord Reid's third dictum in Midland Silicones v. Scrutions 107. 
In his conclusions Walsh J. notes that because the Himalaya clause 
was ineffective in this case, it was unnecessary to go into the question of 
gross negligence but added that : 
If it had been necessary to do so, I would have been inclined to go this far on the 
basis of the evidence before me. Wolfe and Steveco knew or must be deemed to 
have known of the frequency of thefts from sheds in the Port of Montreal at the 
time, they had been warned in advance that cargo of a nature to be easily stolen 
would be in their sheds at a certain time and requested to place same in the special 
security locker which was done. Having done this they were content to protect this 
merchandise at night by merely having one guard normally stationed at a gate 
nearly half a mile from the shed in question and who only made inspection tours 
of the shed every two hours at regular intervals. The presence of another guard 
during the night for the shed in question, or more specifically in the vicinity of the 
security locker in the shed, would certainly have made the theft, in the manner in 
which it was apparently carried out, impossible. I am inclined to believe that even 
the least careful and most stupid person would have engaged another guard at 
least for the nights in question, and that the theft was a direct consequence of 
failure to do this l08. 
The judgment of Walsh J. in the Tarantel is of considerable value for 
amongst other matters: 
a) it reviews carefully and in detail the Himalaya clause jurisprudence in 
respect to the common law; 
b) it held that if Lord Reid's dicta are to be valid they must be strictly 
fulfilled and in the case at hand noted at least two deficiencies — the 
terminal agent dealt only with the stevedore while the stevedore's 
arrangement with the carrier was faulty because the stevedore waived 
his right not to be responsible for pilferage ; 
c) finally the Court looked at the real nature of conditions of the port of 
Montreal and found that the security services, although apparently far 
superior to the services in The Prins Willem III, The Cleveland and The 
Federal Scheide, were still grossly negligent. 
5.5. Marubeni America Corp. v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. & 
International Terminal Operators Ltd. (ITO) 109 
The case arose when 250 cartons of electronic calculators were shipped 
from Kobe, Japan to Montreal where a shortage was noted at the time of 
106. id., at p. 294. 
107. Supra, fn. 13. 
108. [1978] 1 F.C. 269, at p. 295. 
109. F.C. (Trial Div.), Jan. 5, 1979, Marceau J., No. T-3177-74. 
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delivery to the consignee by the stevedore ITO. The judgment is useful and 
interesting even if one does not agree with all of the conclusions. Suit was 
taken against both the carrier (Mitsui) and the stevedore (ITO) and neither 
was held responsible. 
The judgment, as did its predecessors, considers the conditions and 
practices in the port of Montreal as normal rather than gross negligence, in 
fact at one point it was held that there was no fault in delict. 
That carriers and stevedores in the port of Montreal do not check 
goods as they come ashore, unlike almost every civilized and even uncivi-
lized port in the world do, was also not held to be fault or a breach of 
contract but la coutume110. Nor was there any mention of the proposition 
that this local custom is self-serving to carriers and is being protected and 
attenuated by the Courts. 
La défenderesse en effet ne peut fournir de preuve directe du débarquement des 
effets à Montréal. Elle ne le peut pas parce qu'aucune vérification et aucun triage 
de la marchandise débarquée au port de Montréal — et les caisses ici en cause 
n'étaient qu'une partie de cette marchandise comprenant plusieurs milliers de colis 
— n'ont été faits ni par elle-même ni par le manutentionnaire ITO. Il peut sembler 
étonnant pour un profane qu'il en ait été ainsi, mais la preuve a révélé que telle 
était la coutume dans le port de Montréal, coutume qui s'est installée, là comme 
ailleurs, dans un effort pour abréger le temps requis pour le déchargement qui 
pourrait autrement se prolonger considérablement et augmenter d'autant les coûts 
impliqués. En l'absence de preuve directe, la défenderesse n'avait d'autre choix que 
de recourir à une preuve indirecte, par présomption, ce qui lui était loisible 
puisque le débarquement de la marchandise est un fait qui peut donner ouverture 
à n'importe quel mode de preuve1". 
The Court then carefully studied all the evidence of theft in the shed 
ashore and concluded that all the goods which were found to be short upon 
delivery to the consignee were stolen from the shed although the thieves 
and their loot were never found. 
Si la preuve avait contenu le moindre indice positif tendant à donner prise à la 
possibilité que des cartons aient pu disparaître en cours de route ou avoir été 
laissés à bord du navire, j'aurais hésité, mais dans l'état actuel du dossier, je crois, 
comme la défenderesse, que sa preuve est satisfaisante. Je reconnais qu'il y a dans 
cette preuve un faisceau de présomptions qui permet de conclure que les marchan-
dises ont toutes été débarquées à Montréal et que la perte d'une partie d'entre elles 
n'est survenue que par la suite. (Sur la force et la qualité de la preuve requise en 
matière civile, voir Ralph Hanes v. The Wavianesa Mutual Insurance Company 
[1963] S.C.R. 154) " 2 . 
110. Whether La coutume is of legal effect could be questioned on the basis of North and 
South Trust Co. v. Berkeley, [1970] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 467, at p. 479. 
111. Supra, fn. 109, at p. 7. 
112. Id., at p. 9. 
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The Court thus effectively put the burden on the consignee of proving 
the failure of delivery of the carrier to the stevedore. 
In respect of negligence, it is submitted that the Court was also too 
lenient. The judgment itself points out : a) a shortage of guards ; b) no 
rounds at 7:30 p.m. ; c) a locker that had a questionable chain and 
lock ; d) again a motorized lifter (much like the Ceres case) left in the shed 
that night which the Court notes was an exceptional procedure (the lifter 
was warm after the theft); and finally e) there was poor and defective 
lighting in the shed on that night. Yet this was not considered to be gross 
negligence in contract or even negligence in an action in delict against the 
stevedore (ITO). 
Or, je ne vois pas comment, dans le cadre d'une action purement délictuelle et 
indépendante de toute relation contractuelle, il soit possible de prétendre que la 
défenderesse se devait de maintenir un système de sécurité aussi étanche '" . 
The Court also held that contractually the stevedore could benefit by 
the Himalaya clause. The Court relied on the Tarantel decision. 
It is interesting that stipulation pour autrui as validating the Himalaya 
clause was dismissed out of hand : 
Il est vrai que le droit québécois admet plus généralement la possibilité d'une 
"stipulation pour autrui" au sens où l'entend l'article 1029 du Code civil de la 
province de Québec, mais une clause Himalaya dans un contrat de transport peut 
difficilement s'interpréter comme une telle "stipulation pour autrui", puisqu'elle 
ne rend évidemment personne, surtout pas le stevedore ou le manutentionnaire, 
créancier du promettant, l'expéditeur-propriétaire. Que par application du principe 
de l'effet relatif du contrat, le stevedore ou manutentionnaire ne puisse se prévaloir 
directement d'une clause du contrat de transport auquel il n'a été partie ni 
directement, ni par mandataire, me paraît une conclusion inévitable. Je ne vois pas 
comment, en droit québécois au moins et à partir des faits de la présente cause, il 
soit possible (et ce, malgré l'affirmation que l'on retrouve à la fin de la clause ici 
en jeu) de parler du transporteur comme d'un agent ou mandataire du stevedore 
ou du manutentionnaire, au moment où le contrat de transport est intervenu "4 . 
The Marubeni America Corp. judgment is important in that : 
a) it contains another study of the Himalaya clause and follows the 
Tarantel decision holding the clause to be valid ; 
b) it continues to recognize as customary and thus acceptable the present 
standard of practice and care exercised in the port of Montreal by 
carriers and stevedores; 
c) it recognizes that there may be a contract between the stevedore and 
the consignee; although it does not define it; 
113. Id., at p. i l . 
114. Id., at p. 18, 19. 
478 Les Cahiers de Droit ('979) 20 c. de D. 449 
d) it dismisses the proposition that a Himalaya clause falls within the 
terms of stipulation pour autrui. 
It is respectfully submitted that conclusions a) and b) are in error. 
6. The New York Star 
Recently the High Court of Australia put the Himalaya clause into its 
proper perspective in The New York Star (Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd. 
v. Salmon and Spraggon (Australia) Pty Ltd.)Ui Cartons of razor blades 
shipped from St. John, New Brunswick were stolen after discharge in 
Sydney, Australia. The stevedore in charge of the goods was negligent and 
the system of delivery was badly organized so that delivery was made to a 
person without the proper documents. The trial Court held that the steve-
dore could nevertheless benefit by the Himalaya clause and in particular 
the one year delay for suit clause in the bill of lading. 
The Appeal Court " 6 held that the negligence of the stevedore was a 
fundamental breach of the contract but that in accordance with the House 
of Lords decision in Suisse Atlantique111, the fundamental breach did not 
overcome the one year delay for suit. The Appeal Court added that, in any 
event, the Himalaya clause was not applicable here because there was no 
consideration given by the stevedore to permit it to benefit by the protective 
clauses in the bill of lading. 
The High Court of Australia " 8 agreed with the Court of Appeal that 
negligence of the stevedore's employees and their negligent system of 
delivery of goods was a fundamental breach. It also agreed with the Court 
of Appeal that a fundamental breach would overcome a negligence clause 
but did not overcome the one year delay for suit clause. 
The five justices of the High Court then divided in various ways. 
Barwick C.J., Mason J. and Jacobs J. held that Himalaya clauses were 
valid in respect of stevedores and that the discharging by the stevedore was 
the consideration for the contract between the stevedore and the shipper. 
They relied on The Eurymedon. Stephen and Murphy JJ. dissented. 
At this point Mason, Jacobs and Murphy JJ. distinguished the facts of 
The New York Star from The Eurymedon. In The Eurymedon the act of the 
stevedores took place during discharge i.e. during the contract of carriage. 
115. (1978) 18 A.L.R. 333; [1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 298. 
116. [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 445. 
117. Suisse Atlantique Société d'Armement Maritime S.A. v. N.V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Cen-
trale, [1967] 1 A.C. 361 ; [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 529. 
118. (1978) 18 A.L.R. 333; [1979] I Lloyd's Rep. 298. 
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In The New York Star the acts took place after discharge and thus after the 
contract of carriage and in consequence the stevedores could not benefit by 
the bill of lading immunities. Mason and Jacobs JJ. put it this way: 
There is, however, a difference between the facts in The Eurymedon and those in 
the present case. Whereas in The Eurymedon the goods were damaged while they 
were being unloaded, in the present case the goods had been unloaded and the 
contract of carriage was at an end. The goods had been stacked and stored on the 
wharf for 24 hours. It is therefore important to define the precise subject matter 
with which their Lordships were dealing in The Eurymedon. They were dealing 
with a case where the stevedore claimed the same immunity or limitation which 
the carrier at the same time and in the same circumstances could have claimed if it 
had been sued by the shipper. Since the stevedore was unloading the goods from 
the ship, it was performing on behalf of the carrier work which the carrier was 
bound to perform either personally or by its servant or agent (including an 
independent contractor). In whatever of these ways the carrier performed the 
contract it remained liable under the contract according to its terms, including the 
terms limiting liability. In that context the majority of their Lordships in The 
Eurymedon enunciated the course of reasoning whereby in those circumstances a 
contract could be found between shipper and stevedore giving to the stevedore the 
immunities of the carrier. Clause 1 of the bill of lading in The Eurymedon, which 
was in the same terms as cl. 2 of the present bill of lading, extended the immunities 
to a servant or agent of the carrier (including an independent contractor) « in 
respect of any act, neglect or default on his part while acting in the course of or in 
connection with his employment". If the clause had gone further than this, the 
course of reasoning, depending as it did so much on the commercial reality of the 
situation, would not necessarily have been the same " ' . 
In respect of after discharge Mason and Jacobs JJ. said: 
It follows therefore that the appellant stevedore did not as agent for the carrier 
mis-deliver the goods ; rather, it as bailee failed to take reasonable care of the 
goods. This separate act of negligence was not the subject of cl. 2 of the bill of 
lading and therefore the appellant was not entitled to rely on the limitation of 
action provision in cl. 17120. 
In respect of the bill of lading and its effect after discharge Murphy J. said : 
However, the document is not to be read in isolation. As I indicated earlier, this 
one-sided document arises in circumstances where consignees have no real choice 
and the bill reflects this. The question whether the carrier's obligations extended 
beyond the discharge of the cargo conceals the real question which is whether the 
zone of irresponsibility extends beyond the discharge. The document is confused 
enough to treat it as ambiguous. I would read it strongly against the carrier and its 
agent and hold that the exemptions and immunities ceased upon discharge of the 
cargo. Thereafter the stevedore assumed the role of bailee and should be liable as 
such without the exemptions and immunities in the bill of lading12'. 
119. Id., A.L.R. at p. 367; Lloyd's Rep. at p. 320. 
120. Id., A.L.R. at p. 375; Lloyd's Rep. at p. 325. 
121. Id., A.L.R. at p. 377; Lloyd's Rep. at p. 326. 
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The New York Star is therefore of interest to us here in Quebec because : 
a) It rules unanimously that the negligence of the stevedores and their 
negligent system of control at the port constituted a fundamental 
breach (equivalent to civil law faute lourde.) 
b) It rules unanimously that a fundamental breach overcomes a non-
responsibility clause but not a one year delay for suit clause. 
c) It rules (3-2) that a Himalaya clause could benefit a stevedore, the 
consideration for the contract being the discharging. 
d) It rules (3-2) that because the contract of carriage ended at discharge 
the immunities of the bill of lading and the effects of the Himalaya 
clause did not apply to the stevedore for the period after discharge, 
when instead he was responsible as bailee. 
It is noteworthy that unlike The New York Star, The Eurymedon U1 and 
Elder Dempsterl23 were both cases of the loss taking place during the period 
of the carrier's responsibility. In these latter cases the Himalaya clause was 
held to be valid. 
The decision in The New York Star not to apply the non-responsibility 
clause when the contract of carriage is no longer in effect is very similar to 
the views set out in this article in respect of the civil law: a carrier can 
stipulate for the benefit of a third person (stevedore) when the stipulator is 
responsible for the third person as in the contract of porte-fort. A stipu-
lation, benefiting a third party for acts taking place outside the original 
contract is invalid. This is particularly true when the stipulator does not 
accept responsibility for the acts of the third party. 
7. Conclusions 
7.1. The Himalaya clause under the common law 
The Himalaya clause in my view is invalid under the common law. If 
valid at all, it should be treated as the exception it is and the four 
requirements of Lord Reid in Midland Silicones should be strictly complied 
with. In other words strict proof should be required in each case that all the 
links in the chain actually exist. 
The High Court of Australia in The New York Star raises an important 
proposition as well. It is that the Himalaya clause as defined in The 
122. Supra, fn. 15. 
123. Supra, fn. 11. 
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Eurymedon could validly benefit the stevedore during the contract of 
carriage but could not benefit the stevedore after discharge because the 
carrier had not undertaken to care for the goods after discharge. 
7.2. The Himalaya clause and stipulation pour autrui 
(art. 1029 C.C.) 
It is submitted that the Himalaya clause does not comply with the 
terms of art. 1029 C.C. and the principle of stipulation pour autrui because : 
a) a negative benefit (i.e. that a third party will not be liable in delict) 
cannot be stipulated under art. 1029 ; 
b) the third party is neither determined nor determinable by the wording 
of the clause ; 
c) the third party does not signify assent ; 
d) the clause being an exception must be interpreted restrictively. 
Here again, as in the common law, an unbroken chain of relationship 
and complete compliance with the requirements of stipulation pour autrui 
should be proven. 
7.3. Contract of porte-fort 
It is submitted that the Himalaya clause to be valid under the civil law 
does not come within the provisions of stipulation pour autrui in virtue of 
art. 1029 C.C. The Himalaya clause, if properly drafted, could come within 
the provisions of a contract of porte-fort in virtue of art. 1028 C.C. which 
reads as follows : 
A person cannot, by a contract in his own name, bind any one but himself and his 
heirs and legal representatives ; but he may contract in his own name that another 
shall perform an obligation, and in this case he is liable in damages if such 
obligation be not performed by the person indicated. 
The contract of porte-fort is a stipulation for another but the stipulator 
is responsible for the acts of the third party. 
This is similar to the principle in The Eurymedon 124 where the stevedore 
could benefit under the Himalaya clause because the loss took place during 
the contract of carriage but could not in The New York Star125 because the 
loss took place after the contract of carriage (i.e. after discharge.) 
124. Supra, fn. 15. 
125. Supra, fn. 115. 
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7.4. Non-responsibility clauses under the Civil Code 
of Quebec 
In the case of cargoes received in the ports of Quebec for loading on 
board ship, the civil law of Quebec would seem to apply. Even in the case 
of cargoes received after discharge the civil law of Quebec would also seem 
to apply particularly as the Carriage of Goods by Water Act only applies 
from tackle to tackle 126. 
Assuming the Civil Code applies, and the Himalaya clause is valid, it 
is submitted that non-responsibility clauses in bills of lading are without 
effect because: 
a) The shipper has no valid notice of the non-responsibility clause — it is 
only mentioned in a long form bill of lading issued later or not at all 
after being referred to in a short form bill of lading, which latter is 
referred to indirectly in a dock receipt or engagement note or advice 
note. 
b) The parties who benefit by the non-responsibility clause are neither 
clearly nor specifically named. In many cases they are not even deter-
minable; thus notice to the shipper or consignee is not given. 
c) The non-responsibility clause, being an exception, must be interpreted 
restrictively. 
7.5. Gross negligence (Faute lourde) 
It is submitted that the Courts should no longer accept as "normal" or 
la coutume the intentional confusion in the port of Montreal, the inten-
tionally low paid, unqualified, often token watchmen, the lack of proper 
tallying, the intentional disregard for care of cargo. This system, this 
repetition of events is not negligence but gross negligence or faute lourde. 
As Pothier said, this is opposed to good faith ,27. It is submitted that it is 
not good faith because it is a condition that carriers and their agents — the 
stevedores and terminal agents — intentionally take advantage of and are 
responsible for. In my view it oversteps even gross negligence and faute 
lourde — it is fraud or dol. Further, the assumption that la coutume has 
legal effect could be challenged on the basis of the holding of Donaldson J. 
in North and South Trust Co. v. Berkeley ns. Donaldson J. held that "if a 
usage is to have effect in law it must at least be notorious, certain, and 
reasonable." 129 
126. R.S.C. 1970, C. C-15, Rule 1(e). 
127. Supra, fn. 55. 
128. Supra, fn. 110. 
129. Ibid. 
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7.6. The Civil Code revision 
It is essential for the proper working of the ports of Quebec and for 
their reputation and future that the new Civil Code deal with question of 
responsibility before loading and after discharge from vessels in Quebec, 
perhaps by copying the principles found in the French internal law of June 
18, 1966. Or perhaps art. 2430 C.C. should be of public order and should 
apply before and after tackle. The proposed Maritime Code of Canada 
should also deal with the matter in case it is found that shortage and 
pilferage before loading and after discharge are proper subjects of federal 
legislation under section 91 (shipping and navigation) of the British North 
America Act. I3°. 
7.7. Identity of the "carrier" 
I have not dealt fully with one additional problem in this paper. 
The question of who is the carrier is quite complicated under the 
present system of demise charterers, time charterers and voyage charterers 
all of whom along with the shipowner may have or share responsibility as 
carrier under the law. These various parties together or separately issue the 
bill of lading in question or other persons do it for them. For example the 
issuer of the bill of lading may be an unincorporated non-operating entity 
such as "Barber Lines" in The Tarantelm. 
If the Himalaya clause is to be permitted under the common law or the 
civil law, it requires strict observance of Lord Reid's four requirements in 
Midland Silicones l32 or strict observance of the requirements of art. 1029 
C.C. In either case the link with the carrier must be made. 
Is this link really proven when the charterers and owners take such 
pains to hide their identity under the demise clause and other similar 
stipulations and practices ? I have dealt elsewhere with the whole question 
of "Identity of the Carrier" 133 and add nothing further here except to say 
that in the five cases reviewed in this article the identity of the carrier did 
not seem to have been strictly proven although admitted or agreed upon in 
some of the cases. In consequence it is submitted that proof that the 
"carrier" fulfilled the requirements of Lord Reid or of stipulation pour 
autrui should be carefully made in the next case that comes before a court if 
the court intends to declare the Himalaya clause valid. 
130. Sect 91(10), "Navigation and Shipping". 
131. Supra, fn. 5. 
132. Supra, fn. 13. 
133. W TETLEY, supra, fn. 1, pp. 83-98. 
